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We investigated how state neuroticism and state conscientiousness related to
momentary task performance and tested whether these relationships were affected by
the extent to which a person varies in his level of state neuroticism/conscientiousness
across situations. We hypothesized that state neuroticism relates negatively, while state
conscientiousness relates positively tomomentary task performance.Moreover, for both
personality dimensions, we expected the state personality–momentary task performance
relationship to be stronger for employees who behave, feel, and think more consistently
across situations. These hypotheses were tested using a 10-day experience sampling
study in a large financial institution. Multilevel regression analyses revealed that state
neuroticism related negatively and state conscientiousness positively to momentary task
performance. Moreover, the relationship between state conscientiousness and momen-
tary task performance was stronger for people lower in situational within-person
conscientiousness variability. From a theoretical point of view, our findings suggest that
personality states relate to momentary task performance and that this relationship is
stronger for people low in situational within-person variability. From a practical point of
view, they emphasize the importance of taking into account an employee’s state
personality levels and the variability herein, in addition to assessing his/her overall trait
level of personality.
Practitioner points
 Apart from the stable between-person differences in personality (i.e., personality traits), a recruiter
should also gain insight into situation-related fluctuations in the candidate’s personality states, which
will allow the recruiter to determine how this candidate will perform in these situations.
 Recruiters should weigh the information they get from personality assessments differently for people
showing low levels of situational within-person (personality) variability compared to those who are
high in situational within-person (personality) variability.
The main idea underlying the use of personality assessments in an I/O context is that the
position of an individual on a particular personality dimension is predictive of general
indices of job performance (Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991). Although the parsimony of
the underlying idea makes it an attractive one, meta-analytical research has repeatedly
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shown that the relationship between personality traits and general performance is only
moderate at best (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Salgado, 2003). For example, whereas trait
neuroticism and trait conscientiousness are traditionally considered the best personality
predictors of performance, they each account for only 3% and 8%of the variance in overall
job performance, respectively (Judge, Klinger, Simon, & Yang, 2008).
In addition to personality assessments, situational interviews and assessment centres
do also – sometimes unintentionally – include an assessment of personality-related
characteristics, with assessors spontaneously using personality descriptors in their
assessment notes and reports (Lievens, De Fruyt, & Van Dam, 2001). The conjecture here
is that the momentary personality-related behaviours, affects, and cognitions that are
observed andmeasured in specific situations and/or tasks are predictive of the candidate’s
future performance in similar situations and/or tasks. Despite the vital nature of this
assumption, the relationship between state personality or ‘the momentary enactments
that have the same affective, behavioral, and cognitive content as their corresponding
traits’ (Fleeson, 2012, p. 52) and momentary performance has received far less research
attention than the relationship between their trait counterparts. This is exactly where the
present study contributes. In particular, we set out to examine the predictive validity of
state personality for momentary task performance. To do so, we study the relationship
between state neuroticism and state conscientiousness on one hand and momentary task
performance on the other hand. Furthermore, we test the boundary conditions of these
relationships by examining themoderating role of the extent towhich a person fluctuates
in his/her level of state neuroticism or state conscientiousness across situations.
Traits and states: Two sides of the same coin
Personality traits have traditionally been considered to be relatively stable over time and
consistent across situations (Costa & McCrae, 1992), with studies showing that change –
ormaturation – in personality traits indeed occurs over a time span of several years (Wille,
Hofmans, Feys, & De Fruyt, 2014). At the same time, the behaviours, cognitions, and
affects that are characteristic of each of the personality dimensions are also subject to
short-term, situation-induced changes (Heller, Komar, & Lee, 2007). In contrast to
personality traits, such momentary enactments of personality – also referred to as
personality states – are characterized by instability over time and inconsistency across
situations, and they are often conceptualized as responses to changes in the work
environment (Huang & Ryan, 2011).
Although stability and variability seem irreconcilable, it has become clear that a full
understanding of personality can only be obtainedwhen both personality traits and states
are taken into account. In their call for an integrative approach to personality, Judge,
Simon, Hurst, and Kelley (2014) emphasized this by stating that the stable (trait) and the
variable (state) component should not be regarded as contradictory, but rather as two
sides of the same coin with traits pertaining to stable between-individual differences, and
states to short-term variations in the behaviours, affects, and cognitions of interest.
Following this line of thinking, people high in, for example, trait neuroticism are
considered highly neurotic because they are often in a highly neurotic state, whereas
people low in trait conscientiousness are seen as low in overall conscientiousness because
they often experience low state conscientiousness. A similar reasoning underlies
Fleeson’s (2001) density distribution approach to personality. Because people behave,
feel, and think differently on different occasions, their patterns of behaviour, feeling, and
thinking can be summarized using a distribution of states. From this distribution of states,
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the centre of gravity is a good indicator of trait personality as it represents how the
individual behaves, feels, and thinks ‘on average’. As such, also in the density distribution
approach topersonality, people are considered low/high on aparticular trait because they
often experience low/high trait-relevant states. In sum, both the integrative approach to
personality and the density distribution approach to personality argue that personality
traits and states are intertwined rather than counterparts, which implies that both should
be taken into account to arrive at a good understanding of the structure and effects of
personality.
Whereas, until now, we have primarily focused on personality, the same reasoning
holds true for performance as well. Although stable between-individual differences in
performance exist and are important, Beal,Weiss, Barros, andMacDermid (2005), in their
episodic model of performance, demonstrated that performance also changes consider-
ably within a person over short periods of time. As such, performance – very much like
personality – varies both between and within individuals, with both sources of variation
being essential to fully grasp the concept of performance.
The personality–performance relationship: From traits to states
Despite the fact that the relationship between trait personality and general task
performance has received a lot of scholarly attention, the relationship between their
momentary state counterparts remains understudied (see Dalal, Bhave, & Fiset, 2014 for a
recent call). This issue is an important one as it is known that between- andwithin-person
variation are two independent, orthogonal types of variation, with relationships at the
between-person being not readily transferable to the within-person level (Hamaker,
2011). Vancouver, Thompson, and Williams (2001), for example, showed that self-
efficacywas positively related to performance at the between-person level,whereas at the
within-person level, the relationship reversed. The implication of such an awareness is
that, because personality states contain both between- and within-person variability, we
cannot infer the predictive validity of state neuroticism and state conscientiousness for
momentary task performance based on studies that examined their trait counterparts
only; an understanding that hasmajor implications for assessments that drawon these trait
measures, such as personality assessments. To address this gap in the literature, the aim of
the present study was to examine the relationship between state personality and
momentary levels of task performance. To do so,wewill focus on two specific personality
states, namely state neuroticism, or the momentary level of anxiety, distress, and
impulsivity, and state conscientiousness; the momentary level of orderliness, dutifulness,
and achievement striving. The reason for choosing these two personality dimensions is
twofold. First, neuroticism and conscientiousness are the personality dimensions that
best predict task performance (Judge et al., 2008). Second, both neuroticism and
conscientiousness have been found to vary asmuchwithin as between individuals (Heller
et al., 2007).
Moreover, we will also contribute to research on the boundary conditions of the state
personality–momentary task performance relationship by studying how this relationship
is affected by individual differences in the level of variability of state neuroticism/
conscientiousness scores across different situations (which wewill refer to with the term
situational within-person variability). Although there is some initial empirical work on
the boundary conditions of the personality–performance relationship, previous studies
have predominantly focused on contextual moderators such as task complexity (Le et al.,
2011), situational strength (Meyer, Dalal, & Bonaccio, 2009), and autonomy (Barrick &
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Mount, 1993).We add to these studies by studying aperson-relatedmoderator. The reason
for studying situational within-person variability is that, despite the fact that previous
research has almost exclusively focused on the average level of behaviour, affect, and
cognition, situational within-person variability has been shown to moderate the way in
which people react to both external (Beal, Trougakos, Weiss, & Dalal, 2013; Fleeson,
2001) and internal cues (Beal et al., 2013). While we are not the first to study the
moderating role of personality variability on the personality–performance relationship
(Dwight, Wolf, & Golden, 2002), our conceptualization and operationalization of
personality variability differs from that of Dwight et al. (2002).
Personality variability: Conceptualization and operationalization
Previous research on personality variability has often referred to it as traitedness.
Following the seminal work of Allport (1937), who recognized that not all traits are
equally relevant to all individuals, traitedness is defined as the relevance of a personality
trait for an individual’s personality. Despite agreement on its general definition,
subsequent studies have conceptualized it in very different ways. First, most studies –
including the Dwight et al. (2002) study – conceptualized traitedness as the extent to
which trait-relevant behaviours co-vary within an individual (Tellegen, 1988). Following
this conceptualization, traitedness reflects the extent to which an individual has a strong
internal representation of a trait. A second conceptualization refers to the extent towhich
an individual has similar personality states over time when being in the same situations
(i.e., temporal within-person variability). This conceptualization taps into the extent to
which identical situations trigger the same personality-related behaviours across time.
The thirdway inwhich traitedness has been conceptualized is as situationalwithin-person
variability, or the variability in personality states across different situations. This
traitedness conceptualization covers the extent to which a person’s personality-related
behaviour is sensitive to variation in the situation. Because the main focus of our study is
on personality states,which are often conceptualized as responses to changes in thework
environment (Huang & Ryan, 2011), wewill focus on situational within-person variability
in the present paper.
On top of the different conceptualizations of traitedness, each conceptualization can
also be operationalized in various ways. As we focus on situational within-person
variability, we will elaborate on operationalizations of this conceptualization only. The
operationalization of situational within-person variability that has been usedmost often is
one in which people are asked to report how much their trait-relevant behaviour varies
across situations. However, this operationalization has two important downsides. First,
test–retest reliability tends to be low (Amelang & Borkenau, 1986). Second, research has
pointed out that people are not very good in reflecting on their own behaviour, making
this measure prone to measurement error (Pronin, 2007). A second operationalization,
which has been used less often, builds on the density distribution approach of Fleeson
(2001). The idea is that, when repeatedly measuring one’s personality states in different
situations (using, for e.g., experience sampling methodology), a distribution of states can
be constructed. From this distribution of states, several characteristics of the individual’s
personality canbederived.Of particular importance in this context is the dispersionof the
distribution, which reflects howmuch a person’s personality states vary across situations.
Finally, there are also operationalizations that combine the density distribution approach
with a one-time subjective measurement (Edwards & Woehr, 2007; Fleisher, Woehr,
Edwards, & Cullen, 2011). In this approach (called frequency-based personality
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measurement), people are asked to report on the relative frequency of occurrence of
specific behaviours, over a certain period of time. In the present paper, we draw on the
second operationalization (i.e., the density distribution approach based on experience
sampling data) because of two reasons. First, by measuring the personality states when
they appear, we avoid that people have to reflect on their personality variability. Second,
Fleeson (2001) has shown that the test–retest reliability of the density distribution
approach outperforms that of self-reported measures.
Hypotheses development
Inwhat follows, the hypotheses for neuroticism and conscientiousness will be developed
separately as the mechanisms used to explain the state personality–momentary task
performance relationship are different for both personality states.
We expect state neuroticism to relate negatively tomomentary task performance. The
reason is that, to perform at an optimal level, a person permanently needs to regulate
negative thoughts for them not to interfere with his/her normal functioning (Wallace &
Newman, 1997). For a person high in neuroticism, this regulation mechanism gets
disrupted more easily because (s)he is more susceptible to automatic orientation of
attention, the latter being defined as ‘any instance where attention and cognitive
resources are redirected from an ongoing process to distractor stimuli (Wallace &
Newman, 1997; pp. 139–140) or cognitions (p. 142)’. In other words, when an employee
is in a highly neurotic state, s/he will be distracted more easily by irrelevant task cues,
which results in lower levels of task performance. In line with this, Elliot and Thrash
(2002) found that neuroticism is strongly related to avoidance motivation, which in
essence encompasses a heightened sensitivity to negative/undesirable stimuli. This
implies that a person high in neuroticism is more likely to detect negative stimuli, which
in turn lead to lower levels of task performance. According to Ferris et al. (2011), the
reasoning behind this negative relationship boils down to the availability of self-
regulating resources. People high in avoidance motivation continuously focus on
avoiding things that could go wrong. This uses up a lot of the self-regulatory resources
available to that personwhich cannot be invested anymore in a heightened performance,
hence leading him/her to perform worse. In line with this reasoning, Debusscher,
Hofmans, and De Fruyt (2016) found support for such a negative relationship between
state neuroticism and task performance. Because of these reasons, our first hypothesis
reads:2
H1a: State neuroticism relates negatively to momentary task performance.
With respect to themoderating role of situational within-person variability, we expect
that the negative relationship between state neuroticism and momentary task perfor-
mance will be stronger for people who do not vary much in their levels of state
neuroticism (i.e., people low on situational within-person neuroticism variability). This
hypothesis builds on the idea that an individual’s performance can be better predicted
from his/her behaviour, feeling, and thinking when this person shows a low level of
variability in these behaviours, feelings, and thoughts. This principle has already been
shown to hold at the between-person level, where Dwight et al. (2002) have shown that
when a trait is high on traitedness, it predicts future task performance better thanwhen it
is low on traitedness. Based on affect literature, we argue that a similar principle may hold
for within-person variability as well. Beal et al. (2013) found that, while people high on
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affect variability show a higher reactivity to environmental or external cues (i.e., they
experiencemore strain in response to stressful events), they react less strongly to internal
feeling states (i.e., they experience less fatigue in response to psychological strain).
Following this reasoning, wemay expect that for people high in situational within-person
neuroticism variability, their state neuroticism levels will affect their momentary levels of
task performance to a lesser extent. For people with a low level of situational within-
person variability in their neuroticism states, instead, we expect that the current
neuroticism state will allow for a better prediction of the level of momentary task
performance. Hence, our second hypothesis reads:2
H1b: The negative relationship between state neuroticism and momentary task
performance will be stronger for employees who are lower in situational within-person
variability than for employees higher in situational within-person variability.
With respect to state conscientiousness, we expect a positive relationship with
momentary task performance. At the between-person or trait level, Judge and Ilies (2002)
showed that trait conscientiousness strongly and positively relates to performance
motivation, which in turn benefits an employee’s task performance. In particular, in their
meta-analysis, Judge and Ilies (2002) tested three central theories of performance
motivation (goal-setting, expectancy, and self-efficacy motivation), showing that trait
conscientiousness related significantly to all three performance motivation types. We
expect that the performance motivation mechanism explicated above also applies to the
momentary level. More specifically, we believe that variation in state conscientiousness
induces variation in performance motivation, which in turn influences the momentary
level of task performance. If, for example, an employee experiences a high level of state
conscientiousness, s/he will have a higher performance motivation, which in turn will
benefit this person’s momentary levels of task performance. In line with this account,
state conscientiousness encompasses behaviours, feelings, and thoughts such as being
able to hold your impulses in check, being industrious, following the rules, and being
persistent (Meyer et al., 2009), which are all behaviours that promote momentary levels
of task performance. Hence, our hypothesis reads:2
H2a: State conscientiousness relates positively to momentary task performance.
Similar to the reasoning for state neuroticism, we expect the relationship between
state conscientiousness and momentary task performance to be stronger for people who
vary less in their levels of state conscientiousness (i.e., people low in situational within-
person conscientiousness variability). Again, this lines up with the findings of Beal et al.
(2013), according to whom lower levels of situational variability (in their case affect
variability) are associatedwith an increased reactivity to internal feeling states. Applied to
state conscientiousness, this implies that peoplewho vary to a limited degree in their level
of dutifulness, orderliness, and achievement striving across situations (i.e., people low
in situational within-person conscientiousness variability) will show a stronger relation-
ship between theirmomentary level of state conscientiousness and theirmomentary level
of task performance. Hence, our last hypothesis reads:2
H2b: The positive relationship between state conscientiousness and momentary task
performance will be stronger for employees who are lower in situational within-person
variability than for employees higher in situational within-person variability.
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Separating within- and between-person variation in personality states
As state personality pertains to the momentary enactment of personality-related
behaviours in a specific situation, it results from a unique combination of stable
behavioural tendencies (i.e., trait personality) and situation-specific deviations from this
default behavioural level (i.e., within-person differences). In other words, state person-
ality contains a mixture of between- and within-person differences. Therefore, if state
personality would be found to relate to momentary task performance, this relationship
might be due to a relationship of the stable between-person part of state personality with
momentary task performance, a relationship of the variable within-person part of state
personality with momentary task performance, or a combination of both. Similarly, if we
would find amoderation effect of situationalwithin-person variability, thismight bedue to
a moderation of the between-person, the within-person, or the within- and between-
person part. To determine the exact nature of these effects, wewill not only test how state
neuroticism/conscientiousness as a whole relates to momentary task performance, but
also explore whether the effect is due to a relationship with the within- and/or between-
component of state neuroticism/conscientiousness. For the same reason, we will also
explore whether the within- and between-components of state neuroticism/conscien-
tiousness are moderated by situational within-person variability.
Method
Participants
Wecontacted a company in the financial sector to participate in this study, afterwhich the
human resources department asked the employees of one of their administrative sites to
partake. In this way, we received the individual contact details of 331 employees who
were willing to participate. All employees were administrative staff who held different
hierarchical positions within the organization. We contacted these 331 employees via an
online survey system and asked them to fill out a baseline questionnaire. This baseline
questionnaire was filled out by 148 respondents, of which 130 also participated in the
secondpart of the study (i.e., an experience sampling study). For further analyses,weonly
included those employees who filled out the baseline questionnaire and started the
experience sampling study. Sixty percentage of this final sample was female. The average
age of these respondents was 39.3 years (SD = 10.8), and their average organization
tenure was 14.4 years (SD = 12.7).
Procedure
As a first step, participants had to complete a baseline questionnaire querying (1) a set of
demographical variables (e.g., sex, company tenure, and age) and (2) trait personality
using the Mini-Markers scale (Saucier, 1994). One week later, and for 10 consecutive
workdays, employees took part in an experience sampling study in which they received
two electronic questionnaires before noon and two in the afternoon. The first
questionnaire was sent at a random moment during the workday (once before noon
and once in the afternoon) and asked about the momentary level of neuroticism and
conscientiousness. The second questionnaire was sent 1 hr after the first and asked
participants to rate their momentary level of task performance. An interval of 1 hr was
chosen because Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, and Stone (2004) showed that
the averagework episode lasts 61 min. Using a time-lagged procedure, wemade sure that
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the measurement of the predictor and criterion were separated in time, which minimizes
common method bias. This procedure resulted in 1,170 dyadic responses (including
scores on state N, state C, and momentary task performance) of a maximum of 2,600
possible responses (130 participants 9 20 measuring moments).
Measures
Trait and state neuroticismwere measured using the neuroticism adjectives of Saucier’s
(1994) Mini-Markers scale (i.e., unenvious, relaxed, moody, jealous, temperamental,
envious, touchy, and fretful). All adjectiveswere rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from ‘not
at all applicable’ to ‘extremely applicable’. To measure state neuroticism, instructions
were adapted to enable momentary measurement: ‘To what degree do the following
adjectives apply to you at this point in time’. For trait neuroticism, the alpha reliability
coefficient was .72. For state neuroticism, reliability was tested using the multilevel
confirmatory factor analysis approach of Geldhof, Preacher, and Zyphur (2014). The
within-person omega reliability coefficient was .69, while the between-person omega
reliability coefficient equalled .87.
Trait and state conscientiousnesswere measured using the conscientiousness items
of the Mini-Markers scale (i.e., organized, efficient, systematic, practical, disorganized,
sloppy, inefficient, and careless) (Saucier, 1994). All adjectives were rated using a 7-point
scale, ranging from ‘not at all applicable’ to ‘extremely applicable’. To enable momentary
measurement, the instructions for state conscientiousness read: ‘To what degree do the
following adjectives apply to you at this point in time’. The alpha reliability coefficient for
trait conscientiousness was .79. For state conscientiousness, within-person omega
reliability was .43, and between-person omega reliability was .92.
Task performance was measured using the seven-item task performance subscale of
Williams and Anderson (1991). Items were adapted to allow for a self-rated momentary
assessment of task performance. An example item was ‘Since completing the previous
survey, I performed tasks thatwere expected ofme’. All itemswere answered on a 7-point
scale, ranging from ‘completely disagree’ to ‘completely agree’. Thewithin-person omega
reliability coefficient was .81, and the between-person omega reliability coefficient was
.89.
Situational within-person variability was – in line with the density distribution
approach of Fleeson (2001) – not measured directly, but instead calculated from the state
neuroticism and state conscientiousness scores. More specifically, we measured
situational within-person variability for neuroticism (resp. conscientiousness) by calcu-
lating the within-person standard deviation of a person’s state neuroticism (resp.
conscientiousness) scores over the different measurement moments. This implies that a
person with a lowwithin-person standard deviation for state neuroticism varied less (i.e.,
has a lower situationalwithin-person variability) in state neuroticism than someonewith a
high within-person standard deviation.
Analyses
Because participants provided ratings four times a day for 10 consecutive working days,
the data have a nested structure with imeasurements nested within j days, whichwere in
turn nested within k persons. To account for this nested data structure, we modelled the
data using three-level regression analyses using the lme4 package in R (Bates, 2010).
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As a first step, we tested a model with momentary tasks performance as the
outcome and the grand mean centred scores of state neuroticism and state
conscientiousness as predictors. To test whether the effect of state neuroticism/
conscientiousness varied across persons and days, we tested whether the slope of
state neuroticism/conscientiousness was fixed or random at both levels of the
hierarchy. For example, to test whether the effect of state neuroticism varied across
persons, we tested whether a model with a random slope for state neuroticism on the
person-level fitted our data significantly better than a model without random slopes.
Similarly, to test whether the effect of state neuroticism varied across persons and
days, we tested whether a model with a random slope for state neuroticism on the
person-level fitted our data better than a model with a random slope for state
neuroticism on both the person- and day-level. To test whether the model with the
random slope fitted significantly better than the one without random slopes, both
models were compared using a log-likelihood difference test. Statistically significant
random effects were included in the final model, while non-significant random slopes
were trimmed (Sieracki, Leon, Miller, & Lyons, 2008).
In a secondmodel,we added themain effects of situationalwithin-personvariability, as
well as the interactions between state neuroticism and conscientiousness and situational
within-person variability. This allowed testing the moderating effect of situational within-
person variability on the state personality–momentary task performance relationship. The
situational within-person variability scores were grand mean centred before adding them
to the model.
Finally, we tested a model in which we separated between- and within-person
variation in state neuroticism and state conscientiousness. Between-person variation
was obtained by, for each participant, averaging his/her state neuroticism/conscien-
tiousness scores across all measurements occasions. This yields a person-specific
average state neuroticism/conscientiousness score that captures between-person
differences in the average neuroticism/conscientiousness level. To obtain the within-
person component, we group mean centred (or person-centred) the state neurot-
icism/conscientiousness scores. By centring the scores around the person-specific
averages, all between-person differences are removed from the data, with the
remainder being within-person differences only. After this data-pre-processing step,
we predicted momentary task performance from (1) the group mean centred (or
person-centred) state neuroticism and state conscientiousness scores (capturing the
within-person differences), (2) the person-specific average state neuroticism and state
conscientiousness scores (capturing the between-person differences), and (3) the
interaction between the group mean centred state scores and the person-specific
average state scores (the interaction of the within- and between-person differences).
Moreover, we added moderation effects between (4) the group mean centred scores
and situational within-person variability, (5) the person-specific average state
personality scores and situational within-person variability, and (6) the group mean
centred scores, the person-specific average state personality scores, and situational
within-person variability. This final model allowed to test whether situational within-
person variability moderated the within-person part (i.e., the group mean centred
scores), the between-person part (i.e., the person-specific average state scores), or the
combination of both (i.e., the interaction between the group mean centred and the
person-specific average state scores).
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Results
Descriptive statistics for all study variables are shown in Table 1. From this table, it can be
seen that a large part of the variation in task performance, state neuroticism, and state
conscientiousness was situated at the within-person level (i.e., 50%, 37%, and 44%,
respectively). The data thus support our claim that personality and performance do not
only vary between, but alsowithin individuals. Next, we aggregated the state neuroticism,
state conscientiousness, and momentary task performance scores to the person-level and
computed correlations between all study variables. These correlations revealed that – in
line with previous studies – between-person differences in the aggregated state
neuroticism and conscientiousness scores related in a negative and positive way,
respectively, to the aggregated momentary task performance scores. Moreover, whereas
variability in neuroticism (i.e., situational within-person neuroticism variability) corre-
lated positively with the aggregated state neuroticism scores (i.e., mean state neuroti-
cism), and variability in conscientiousness (i.e., situational within-person
conscientiousness variability) was negatively related to the aggregated state conscien-
tiousness scores, these correlationswere lowenough to conclude that the average and the
level of situational within-person variability tap into separate aspects of personality.
Finally, Table 1 also illustrates that the aggregated state neuroticism and conscientious-
ness scores were highly correlated with trait measures of neuroticism (r = .68) and
conscientiousness (r = .70), meaning that the average of a distribution of states can
indeed be interpreted as a proxy of an employee’s personality trait (Fleeson, 2001). This
can be further ratified by the fact that the correlations between the respective trait and
situational within-person variability scores (r = .25 for neuroticism and r = .27 for
conscientiousness)were very similar to those between the aggregated state scores and the
situational within-person variability scores (r = .28 for neuroticism, and r = .35 for
conscientiousness).
Next, we tested a series of three-level regression models. Because the multilevel
regression model assumes residual independency, we first tested whether the auto-
regressive effect of task performance – the effect of task performance at time t on task
performance at time t + 1 –was statistically significant. As this was not the case (c = .08,
p = .09), we proceeded without including the autoregressive effect. In what follows, we
split up the result section for state neuroticism and state conscientiousness. Note that this
is only done for reasons of clarity and that both personality dimensions were always
entered simultaneously in all models (see Table 2 for an overview). Because our
hypotheses pertain to the fixed part of the models, we will only report the fixed effects.
State neuroticism
When testing the effect of state neuroticismonmomentary task performance (seeModel 1
in Table 2), we found that state neuroticism was negatively related to momentary task
performance (c = 0.10, p = .005). As a result, Hypothesis 1a was supported.
Next, the main effect of within-person neuroticism variability and the interaction
between state neuroticism and within-person neuroticism variability were added to the
model to testwhether situationalwithin-person variability in state neuroticismmoderated
the state neuroticism–momentary task performance relationship. The results of this
analysis (see Model 2 in Table 2) showed that there was no statistically significant
moderation effect (c = 0.15, p = .258).
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Third, we separated within- and between-person variation in state neuroticism and
tested their unique effects on momentary task performance (see Model 3 in Table 2).
Results showed that between-person differences in state neuroticism related in a negative
way (c = 0.23, p = .005), while within-person differences in state neuroticism did not
relate to momentary task performance (c = 0.07, p = .184). The interaction between
the within- and between-person differences in state neuroticism approached conven-
tional levels of significance (c = 0.14, p = .053). With respect to the moderating effect of
within-person neuroticism variability, we found that the interaction with within-person
differences in state neuroticism (c = 0.11, p = .553) as well as the interaction with
between-person differences in state neuroticism (c = 0.11, p = .697) was not signif-
icant. The three-way interaction between within-, between-person differences in state
neuroticism, andwithin-personneuroticism variability approached conventional levels of
significance (c = 0.42, p = .056). When plotting this three-way interaction (see
Figure 1), it can be seen that the within-person state neuroticism–momentary task
Table 2. Parameter estimates of the three multilevel regression models
c SE p-value Deviance
Model 1
Intercept 5.66 0.05 <.001 2,276
State Ngmc 0.10 0.03 .005
State Cgmc 0.36 0.05 <.001
Model 2
Intercept 5.64 0.05 <.001 2,256
State Ngmc 0.12 0.04 .004
State Cgmc 0.40 0.06 <.001
SD Ngmc 0.65 0.25 .009
SD Cgmc 0.54 0.30 .066
State Ngmc 9 SD Ngmc 0.15 0.13 .258
State Cgmc 9 SD Cgmc 0.59 0.24 .015
Model 3
Intercept 5.64 0.05 <.001 2,202
State Ngwc 0.07 0.05 .184
State Cgwc 0.40 0.07 <.001
Mean state Ngmc 0.23 0.08 .005
Mean state Cgmc 0.54 0.09 <.001
SD Ngmc 0.78 0.24 .002
SD Cgmc 0.19 0.30 .542
State Ngwc 9 mean state Ngmc 0.14 0.07 .053
State Cgwc 9 mean state Cgmc 0.29 0.10 .004
State Ngwc 9 SD Ngmc 0.11 0.18 .553
State Cgwc 9 SD Cgmc 0.45 0.33 .172
Mean state Ngmc 9 SD Ngmc 0.11 0.28 .697
Mean state Cgmc 9 SD Cgmc 0.32 0.47 .496
State Ngwc 9 mean state Ngmc 9 SD Ngmc 0.42 0.22 .056
State Cgwc 9 mean state Cgmc 9 SD Cgmc 1.31 0.60 .029
Note. gmc = grand mean centred; gwc = group mean centred; SD = standard deviation; mean
state = person-specific average state.
Number of unique observation in Model 1 = 1,170 (from 113 participants); number of unique
observations in models 2 and 3 = 1,168 (from 111 participants).
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performance relationship is stronger for individuals who are low on within-person
neuroticism variability and who are on average low in state neuroticism.
Finally, two competing models were tested. First, we tested whether the moderating
effect of within-person neuroticism variability on the state neuroticism–momentary task
performance relationship was quadratic in nature. Such a quadratic relationship would
imply a null rather than a strong effect at extremely high levels ofwithin-person variability.
Our results, however, showed that the quadratic moderating effect was not significant
(c = 4.06, p = .11). Second, we also tested whether, similar to Le et al. (2011) and
Debusscher, Hofmans, and De Fruyt (2014), there was a curvilinear, rather than a linear,
relationship between state neuroticism and momentary task performance. Again, no
curvilinear relationship could be found (c = 0.07, p = .15).
State conscientiousness
In our firstmodel (seeModel 1 in Table 2), we found a positive relationship between state
conscientiousness and momentary task performance (c = 0.36, p < .001). Hence,
Hypothesis 2a was supported.
Subsequently, the main effect of within-person conscientiousness variability and the
interaction between state conscientiousness and within-person conscientiousness
variability were added to the model. The results of this analysis (see Model 2 in Table 2)
revealed a statistically significant moderation effect of within-person conscientiousness
variability on the relationship between state conscientiousness and momentary task
performance (c = 0.59, p = .015). To inspect the exact nature of this moderation, we
plotted the relationship between state conscientiousness and momentary task perfor-
mance as a function of low (mean variability  1 SD), average (mean variability), and high
(mean variability + 1 SD) levels of conscientiousness variability. Figure 2 shows that – in
line with Hypothesis 2b – the relationship between state conscientiousness and
Figure 1. The three-way interaction between the within-person component of state neuroticism (N
state), mean state neuroticism (N trait), and situational within-person neuroticism variability.
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momentary task performancewas stronger for people low (mean variability  1 SD) than
for people high in within-person conscientiousness variability (mean variability + 1 SD).
Third, we separated within- and between-person variation in state conscientiousness
and tested their unique effects on momentary task performance (see Model 3 in Table 2).
This revealed a significant positive effect of between-person differences (c = 0.54,
p < .001) as well as a significant positive effect of within-person differences in state
conscientiousness (c = 0.40, p < .001) onmomentary task performance. The interaction
between between- andwithin-person differences in state conscientiousness was negative
(c = 0.29, p = .004). Regarding the moderating effect of within-person conscientious-
ness variability, we found that the interactions with within-person differences in state
conscientiousness (c = 0.45, p = .172), as well as with between-person differences in
state conscientiousness, was non-significant (c = 0.32, p = .496). The three-way inter-
action between within-, between-person differences in state conscientiousness, and
within-person conscientiousness variability was statistically significant (c = 1.31,
p = .029). Figure 3 shows that the within-person relationship between state conscien-
tiousness and momentary task performance is strongest for employees who are low in
within-person conscientiousness variability and on average low in state conscientious-
ness.
Finally, we tested a curvilinear moderation effect of within-person conscientiousness
variability on the state conscientiousness–momentary task performance relationship.
Similar to neuroticism, no such quadratic moderating effect was found (c = 13.13,
p = .31).
Discussion
With the present paper, we contributed to a better understanding of the relationship
between personality and task performance by showing that the relationships that have
Figure 2. The relationship between state conscientiousness and momentary task performance as a
function of low (mean variability  1 SD), average (mean variability), and high (mean variability + 1 SD)
levels of conscientiousness variability.
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repeatedly been found at the trait level do generalize to the situation-specific, state level.
More specifically, our results revealed that state personality significantly predicted
momentary levels of task performance. This finding is an important one as it implies that it
might beworthwhile to try to go beyond typical trait assessments and develop procedures
and instruments that specifically tap into the state part of personality (Beckmann,
Minbashian, & Wood, 2011).
A second contribution of our paper is that we added to a better understanding of the
boundary conditions of the personality–performance relationship. Whereas previous
research has predominantly focused on contextual moderators, our findings showed the
importance of person-related moderators by demonstrating that for people low on trait
personality, the state personality–momentary task performance relationship is stronger
for people whose level of state personality is more consistent across situations than for
people whose level of state personality varies a lot. In what follows, we will discuss the
theoretical and practical implications.
Theoretical implications
By demonstrating that state personality relates to momentary task performance, we
revealed a clear resemblance between the personality–task performance relationship at
the trait and state level. More specifically, our results showed that, similar to trait
neuroticism, high (respectively low) state neuroticism related to low (respectively high)
levels of momentary task performance, while high (respectively low) state conscien-
tiousness was linked to high (respectively low) levels of momentary task performance.
Moreover, we showed that, when looking at the two constituents of state personality,
both within- and between-person variation in state personality related in a similar way to
momentary task performance. This is an important finding as previous research has
shown that the size (Fisher, 2003) and even the direction (Vancouver et al., 2001) of the
Figure 3. The three-way interaction between the within-person component of state conscientiousness
(C state), mean state conscientiousness (C trait), and situational within-person conscientiousness
variability.
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relationship between variables can change when going from the between-person to the
within-person level.
Further, our results underscored the importance of situational within-person
variability by showing that the state conscientiousness–momentary task performance
relationship was stronger for people whose state conscientiousness was less variable
during a 10-day period. From a statistical point of view, this finding is counterintuitive as,
according to the principle of range restriction, a weaker relationship is expected for
people lowon situationalwithin-person variability as the range of their scores is restricted.
The fact that we found the opposite relationship, despite the issue of range restriction,
makes a compelling case for the important role of situational within-person variability.
Moreover, our findings were in line with the results of Beal et al. (2013) who found that
situational variability is linked to a increased reactivity to external cues, but at the same
time also to a decreased reactivity to internal feeling states. This might imply that people
higher in situational within-person variability react more to trait-relevant cues and less to
the personality states themselves. Yet, an alternative explanationmight be that situational
within-person variability in neuroticism reflects emotional instability, while situational
within-person variability in conscientiousness captures a lack of dependability, and that
neither of them are fully captured by their respective trait measures. Because of this,
testing the reasons for the effects of situational within-person variability is an avenue for
future research.
When exploring the moderating effect of situational within-person variability by
breaking down state personality into its key constituents, we found that the moderation
resulted from the fact that within-person variation in personality predicted within-person
variation in task performance better when situational within-person variability was low,
but only when the average state level was low as well. Interestingly, this finding held true
for both conscientiousness and neuroticism (note that it only approached conventional
levels of significance in the latter case). As such, our findings not only suggest that the trait
level and the level of situational within-person variability represent different features of a
person’s personality (r = .28; p < .01 for neuroticism and r = .35; p < .01 for
conscientiousness), but also that momentary task performance is a function of their
unique combination. This finding is not a trivial one as it adds an additional layer of
complexity to the current knowledge on the personality–performance relationship.
Moreover, the effect of situational within-person variability does not boil down to a
reliability effect. As situational within-person variability taps into the reliability of the
average personality state scores across measurement occasions (i.e., temporal reliability),
onemight expect that itwould primarilymoderate the relationship between the between-
person component of state personality andmomentary task performance (with a stronger
relationship in case the between-person component is measured more reliably). Yet, our
findings reveal that the moderation effect is more complicated, thereby underscoring the
substantive importance of situational within-person variability as an important compo-
nent of personality. However, before strong claims can be made, we believe that more
research is needed to deepen our understanding on how these three elements of
personality (i.e., within-person variation in state personality, trait personality, and
situational within-person variability) jointly predict momentary task performance.
A final important theoretical implication concerns the way in which we conceptu-
alized personality variability and more specifically the way in which this differs from how
others have conceptualized it. When comparing the results of our study with those of the
Dwight et al. (2002) study – who conceptualized personality variability as the extent to
which trait-relevant behaviours co-vary within an individual – we see that both studies
Personality variability and task performance 345
arrive at similar conclusions. In particular, for both conceptualizations, the personality–
task performance relationship is stronger for peoplewhose personality varies less than for
people whose personality varies more. We suggest that the large similarities across both
conceptualizations hint towards the existence of a general law that dictates that the
personality–performance relationship is stronger for people who show low variability in
their personality. For personality variability conceptualized as co-variation of the trait
indicators, this implies that the personality–performance relationship is stronger for
people forwhom the different indicators or facets of the personality dimension agree. For
situational within-person variability, the moderating effect of situational within-person
variability means that the personality–performance relationship is stronger for people
who consistently experience similar levels of a certain personality dimension across
different situations.
It might beworthwhile to test this general law for other types of personality variability
as well. One type that might be particularly interesting, and that received little scholarly
attention to date, is temporal variability.With respect to this third type of variability,Wille
et al. (2014) have shown that over a period of several years, personality changes (or
maturation) do occur and that these changes are subject to large interindividual
differences. Building on these findings, we expect that individual differences in
maturation (i.e., temporal variability) might moderate the strength of the personality–
task performance relationship in the sense that we expect a stronger personality–task
performance relationship for peoplewho show little to no changes in personality over the
course of several years, than for people whose personality level is subject to more
substantial maturation. The rationale behind this proposition is again in line with the
general law of variability because we expect that when there is more variability (in this
case less maturation) in the predictor (i.e., personality); it is more difficult to predict the
criterion (i.e., task performance).However, before strong substantive claims canbemade,
this proposition should be tested.
Practical implications
During the past decade, there has been a steady increase in the use of situational testing
methods, with some well-known examples being situational interviews and assessment
centres. Despite this trend, personality assessment still remains largely trait-oriented,with
most assessment tools aiming to get a snapshot of the overall, trait level of personality. Our
findings suggest that, apart from these stable between-person differences in personality, it
might also be important for a recruiter to gain insight into situation-related fluctuations in
the candidate’s personality states. For this reason, we urge practitioners to not only focus
on stable, between-person differences, but also to try to assess candidate’s personality
states. This can be accomplished by asking people to describe how they behaved, felt, and
thought in a range of (work-related) situations they recently experienced. For example,
one may ask the candidate to describe how s/he behaved, felt, and thought when s/he
encountered situations with little/much work pressure. Alternatively, the situational
variation that is already present in assessment centres can also be used for this purpose.
We believe that assessing these personality states will enable recruiters and assessment
professionals to get a better viewon all aspects of the personality of the candidate, thereby
allowing for a better prediction of his/her future (task) performance, both in general and
in specific situations.
Moreover, practitioners should also try to assess the level of personality variability of
the candidate. This can be accomplished in several ways. First, traitedness can be assessed
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by calculating a measure of variability across the several indicators of a personality
dimension. Second, situational within-person variability can be assessed by having
candidates describe their level of (state) personality in a range of different situations, after
which variability across the different situations can be calculated for each personality
dimension separately. Note, that assessing personality variability – and more specifically
situational within-person variability – is far from trivial as we have shown that for people
who have a low trait score and behave, feel, and think very similarly across situations, the
level of state personality is a better predictor of momentary task performance than for
people who behave, feel, and think very inconsistently across different situations. This
finding suggests that recruiters should weigh the information they get from personality
assessments differently for peoplewho showa low than for people showing a high level of
situational within-person variability.
Limitations and further research
A first limitation of our study is that task performance was self-rated. Yet, this issue is
especially problematic when studying pure between-person differences, because in that
case between-person differences in self-serving biasmay interferewith true differences in
task performance. In our study, the issue of self-rated task performances is less of a
concern because the task performance scores are compared to the person’s own baseline
(i.e., the person’s average task performance score), rather than to the task performance of
other individuals. This implies that, when a person consistently overestimates (or
underestimates) his/her task performance, this overestimation (or underestimation) will
bias all his/her momentary task performance ratings and can therefore be removed from
the data by not looking at the raw task performance ratings, but at the deviations of the
momentary task performance ratings from the person-specific average (i.e., the average
momentary task performance for that individual). Because this is exactly what the
multilevel regression analysis does by estimating random intercepts (i.e., the average
momentary task performance for each individual), we can be confident that self-serving
biases have not confounded our results. An important assumption underlying this
reasoning is that the degree of over- or underestimation does not vary as a function of the
situation. If this assumption does not hold – for example, when an employee’s subjective
performance rating depends on his/her level of state personality – self-ratings would still
increase self-servingbias incidence. Similarly,weneed to assume that the type of tasks that
are carried out by an employee do not lead to a tendency to over- or underestimate
performance. When this assumption does not hold –when, for example, the tendency to
overestimate performance occurswhen a larger variety of tasks and related behaviours are
expected from an individual – self-ratings could still bias the performance measurement.
To solve these issues, future research could make use of other-ratings and/or objective
performance measures. However, these latter two options are also potentially problem-
atic. It is, for example, extremely difficult for a peer or supervisor to assess an employee’s
task performance several times a day. Using objective task performance data, in turn,
raises external validity problems as objective task performance data can only be collected
for a limited number of occupational groups (e.g., sales people or call centre employees).
Because the measurement of state neuroticism and state conscientiousness always
preceded the measurement of momentary task performance, we are confident that state
personality preceded momentary performance. To make an even stronger case for the
directionality of our results, we tested the effect of task performance at time t1 on state
personality at time t. Results from this analysis showed that for both state neuroticism
Personality variability and task performance 347
(c = 0.02; p = .488) and state conscientiousness (c = 0.01; p = .366), such a reversed
effect was not supported by our data. Together, these findings suggest that state
neuroticism/conscientiousness indeed preceded momentary task performance, and not
the other way around. Apart from the clear advantage of separating the measurement of
state personality and task performance, this separation also has a downside. In the 1-h time
span between both measurements, state personality might have changed as a result of
external or internal factors. For example, it is possible that the measurement of state
personality and that of task performance pertained to a different work episode, which
would lower the correspondence between our measurement of state personality and the
level of state personality during the task performance. As this should weaken the
relationship between state personality and task performance, our findings are probably an
underestimation of the true relationships. Furthermore, the within-person omega
reliability coefficient for state conscientiousness was rather low (Ω = .43). We, however,
believe that this does not challenge our findings as we found a statistically significant
relationship between the within-person component of state conscientiousness and
momentary task performance (while unreliability traditionally limits the validity and thus
leads to non-significant relationships).
Another issue that deserves attention is that our measure of situational within-person
variability is not free of measurement error. Of particular relevance here are the potential
effects of transient error and the confounding of context and time in our study. Transient
error pertains to longitudinal variations in peoples’ responses tomeasures as a function of
random variations in these peoples’ psychological states across time (Schmidt, Le, & Ilies,
2003). If transient error co-varied with our state measurements, it confounded our
measure of within-person variability. Another important type of error variation follows
from the fact that we were unable to disentangle the effects of time and context. Because
wequeried employees repeatedly over the course of several days, themeasurementswere
taken at different moments in time and in different situations (see Dalal et al., 2014). As
the temporal variation is typically very small in experience sampling studies (i.e., in our
study, the research spanned a period of 2 weeks – or ten different workdays), variation in
personality states is traditionally interpreted as being the result of between-situation
differences, an interpretation that we also adhere to. However, to actually disentangle
temporal and situational variation, experimental research is needed, which is an avenue
for further research.
A next limitation is that we did not gather information on the specific tasks the
participants were fulfilling and the situation they were in. It is therefore possible that one
employee had to do the same task all day long, whereas another participant might have
had very different tasks. This implies that we were not able to check whether the level of
task variation had an effect on an employee’s within-person variability levels. Therefore,
future research would benefit from asking participants to shortly describe the tasks they
were carrying out and the situation theywere in, just before responding to the experience
sampling prompts.
Another interesting avenue for further research is to test the moderating effect of
situational within-person variability for other personality dimensions than those included
in the present paper. This is especially relevant as the correlation between neuroticism
variability and conscientiousness variability (r = .48) suggests that, although it is to some
extent person-specific, situational variability might also partly be dimension specific. Also
at the criterion side, future research should not be restricted to momentary task
performance, but instead should include forms of extra-role performance such as
organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB) and counterproductive work behaviour
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(CWB) (Rotundo & Sackett, 2002). These two types of performance are particularly
relevant as Chiaburu, Oh, Berry, Li, and Gardner (2011) showed that personality relates
more strongly to extra-role performance (e.g., OCB andCWB) than to in-role performance
(i.e., task performance). Future research should also try studying the mechanisms that
might help explain how the unique combination of state personality and situational
within-person variability affects momentary levels of performance. An important and
relevant mediator in this regard – and particularly in service organizations – can be
customer orientation (Brown, Mowen, Donovan, & Licata, 2002).
A final recommendation for future research is to replicate our findings in other sectors.
In this study, our sample consisted of employeesworking for a large financial institution. It
is possible that these employees were (unwillingly) selected into these financial jobs
because of their low variability in state conscientiousness. Situational variability data from
individuals employed in other occupational sectors are needed to determine whether
variability levels differ from one sector (or occupational group) to the other or not,
thereby making broader generalizations possible.
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